Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01065A00010013000499mber 1952

TOP SECRET

1. Recommend the following changes be made under Section 1. SITUATION:

a. Under b(1), strike out, "Russia," and substitute, "the USSR."

b. Under c(2), strike out, "the Presidium in."

c. Change c(3) to read: "The Communist peace offensive will continue to be an effective technique employed to relax the concern of some members of the free world over the Communist menace."

d. Under c(5), strike out, "Russia," and substitute, "the USSR."

e. Strike out all of c(8). This is not necessarily true, nor is it pertinent.

f. We do not agree with the assumption contained in c(10).

g. Recommend deletion of last sentence in e(1).

2. We find it difficult to reconcile the meaning of l.e.(2), and 2.b. with the quotation from NSC 10/5 contained in 2.c. and the "defensive posture" recommended under Mission A, in 2.c.(1).

While decisive operations are envisaged beginning 1 July 1955 and successfully culminating not later than 30 June 1960 (2.b.), discussion under Mission A mentions a defensive posture, Mission B lists selective aggressive action, Mission C speaks of preparatory action, and Missions D, E, and F will only produce either partial accomplishments or only further planning.

Only in 3.b.(5) is there any reference to the need for determination of whether the effort is to be defensive, countering, or aggressive, based on political and intelligence analysis.

3. What is intended in 3.c.(4)?

Hes for I may or may not be true and dole not appeals to be pertuinent.